苏联也想对德先出拳的，只是没料到被希特勒抢了先手。下面是美军战争学院教育中心4.5年前的一场学术讲座。讲演者是研究苏军的学者。他用了大量解密的原苏联档案。讲座有45分钟，后面还有听众提问。为了节省大家时间，我给一个摘要吧。
苏德瓜分波兰后，双方心知肚明他们之间必有一战。斯大林让外交人民委员莫洛托夫与德外长里宾特洛甫谈判周旋，目的只有一个，拖延时间，熬到1941冬不起战端就行。这是因为苏联已经计划先下手为强，经波兰突入德国。铁木辛哥、朱可夫参与了筹划。作战计划是朱可夫的手稿，没有签字没有打印件，可见密级之高。
德军的闪电战，能迅速大纵深突入苏军防线，是因为这些部队的训练是进攻不是防守，还有就是苏军指挥官大都是政治可靠的军事菜鸟。苏军刚开始的惨状，绝对不是斯大林爱好和平，毫无准备被卑鄙法西斯暗算了。他吃惊的只是，他的外交技俩没能忽悠住希特勒，买来他需要的时间。
德军在战争初期，意外顺利，俘虏了上百万苏军，甚至包括斯大林的长子。苏军为何把大量的兵力前出到苏德边境呢？看来德军元帅曼施坦因以后的推断：“关于俄国部队的部署究竟是防御性的还是攻击性的，曾引起很多辩论。不过如果考虑到在俄国西部所集中的兵力数量，以及在比亚威斯托克和腊瓦两个地区附近所集中的强大装甲兵力，那么我们也许应该附和希特勒的说法，那就是俄国迟早会采取攻势。” 不无道理。
欢迎讨论，谩骂恕不回复。
讲座的英文摘要：（建议有时间，还是听完。比城里绝大部分贴专业多了，也非常有趣）
The Problem with Preemptive War: Soviet Mobilization Planning, 1938-1941 by Dr. Richard W. Harrison In the spring of 1941, the Red Army high command sat poised to strike the German occupied Polish hinterland in a daring push to alter the course of the Second World War. Meanwhile, the German General Staff was likewise preparing for a blitzkrieg against the Russian western territories with the final prize of Moscow itself. The Russian commanders never carried out their plan to strike the Germans, however, and the German’s treacherous onslaught sprang forth first, resulting in the devastation of much of western Russia and contributing to the final defeat of the Nazi regime. The plan to invade Poland, though never carried out, offers fascinating insight into Soviet military thinking at the highest levels in response to a rapidly changing political-military situation. On Wednesday, January 18, 2017, Dr. Richard W. Harrison gave a lecture at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania based on his years of research on the Russian plan to invade Nazi-occupied Poland. He breaks down the Russian plan and tie his conclusions to todays’ preemptive warfare theory. The lecture opens with a brief review of previous Soviet mobilization plans as they developed in 1938 and throughout World War II. The early plans were defensive in nature and tasked the Red Army, due to its slower pace of mobilization, to absorb the initial enemy attack, followed by a counterstroke to pulverize the Nazi menace. The idea of a massive counteroffensive gradually evolved into the preemptive attack plan of 1941, carrying the high command’s desire to push through southeastern Poland, followed by an advance into Germany. The lecture examines the forces allotted for the preemptive attack, the route of their projected advance, and the interplay of personalities among the plan's authors and Stalin. Dr. Harrison concludes with a discussion of the strategy's utility and the lingering consequences of some of its component parts during the first weeks of the war.