谷歌翻译联合国新疆人权评估
79、Additional allegations of broader negative impacts of the “Strike Hard” campaign and associated policies in XUAR on the human rights of persons belonging to ethnic communities have arisen, beyond the aspects of large-scale deprivation of liberty of certain categories of individuals already described in this assessment. Claims have been made, specifically in terms of undue restrictions on cultural, linguistic, and religious identity and expression; rights to privacy and movement; reproductive rights; as well as with respect to employment and labour rights. Many of these reflect broader trends in ethnic minority regions that have been highlighted by UN human rights mechanisms over many years. These are discussed in turn below.
新疆“严打”运动和相关政策对少数民族人权产生更广泛的负面影响的指控已经出现，除了已经描述的某些类别的大规模剥夺自由的方面。在本次测评中。有人提出索赔，特别是对文化、语言和宗教身份和表达的不当限制；隐私权和行动权；生育权；以及在就业和劳工权利方面。其中许多反映了联合国人权机制多年来强调的少数民族地区更广泛的趋势。这些将在下面依次讨论。
A、Religious, cultural and linguistic identity and expression
中国宪法和《民族区域自治法》
80、The right of members belonging to minorities to be protected from discrimination is enshrined in China’s Constitution and in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and has been reiterated in numerous official policy documents featuring equality, unity, regional ethnic autonomy, and common prosperity for all ethnic groups. The Government has consistently denied allegations of any discrimination against the Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities in XUAR, and highlights the representation of ethnic minorities in regional government and the National People’s Congress. Numerous UN human rights mechanisms, however, have expressed concerns about restrictions on cultural rights and the rights to freedom of religion and expression in ethnic minority regions, including XUAR, over past years.
规定保护少数民族成员不受歧视的权利，并在许多以平等、团结、民族区域自治和共同富裕为主题的官方政策文件中得到重申。政府一贯否认对新疆维吾尔族和其他以穆斯林为主的少数民族的任何歧视指控，并强调少数民族在自治区政府和全国人民代表大会中的代表性。然而，许多联合国人权机制在过去几年对包括新疆在内的少数民族地区的文化权利以及宗教和言论自由权的限制表示担忧。
81、In the context of implementation of the Government’s purported counter-terrorism and counter-“extremism” strategies, these concerns have assumed sharper focus through progressively tighter regulation of religious practice.
在执行政府所谓的反恐和反“极端主义”战略的背景下，通过逐步收紧对宗教活动的监管，这些关切变得更加突出。
82、Freedom of religion and “normal religious activities” are protected in China’s Constitution, and the Government cites that more than 20 million people follow Islam in provinces and regions throughout China. However, laws and other legal texts applicable in China generally and in XUAR specifically regulate religion in a detailed, intrusive and particularly controlling manner. Religious activities are allowed only in Government-approved locations, conducted by Government-accredited personnel, and on the basis of Government-approved teachings and publications.Religious activity is strictly prohibited in “state institutions, schools of national education, public institutions and other places”. Children are not allowed to participate in religious activities. The Government, however, indicated that it advocates a form of “Islam with Chinese characteristics” which adheres to core beliefs but is better adapted to Chinese society and can play a positive role in China’s economic and social development.
宗教自由和“正常的宗教活动”受到中国宪法的保护，政府援引中国各省和地区超过 2000 万人信奉伊斯兰教。但是，普遍适用于中国和新疆的法律和其他法律文本以详细、侵入性和特别控制的方式具体规范宗教。宗教活动只允许在政府批准的地点，由政府认可的人员进行，并根据政府批准的教义和出版物进行。 严禁在“国家机构、国民教育学校、公共机构和其他场所”。儿童不得参加宗教活动。 然而，政府表示，它提倡一种“有中国特色的伊斯兰教”形式，它坚持核心信仰，但更适合中国社会，可以在中国经济和社会发展中发挥积极作用。
83、The “Strike Hard” campaign has led to the adoption or amendment of various legal instruments to further tighten the regulation of religion, that resulted in the regulation of religion, including the obligation of “any organization or individual [to] consciously resist religious extremism and illegal religious activities”.As highlighted above, “extremism” is defined broadly, while the legal instruments include a list of “primary expressions of extremism” that have in practice been accompanied by lists of “signs” of “religious extremism” to assist officials and the general public in identifying “extremist” behaviour in the community.These “expressions” and “signs” include conduct that may in the circumstances be of legitimate concern, such as “inciting ‘Jihad’, advocating and carrying out violent terrorist activities”,but range far more widely, encompassing an exceptionally broad range of acts that in themselves constitute exercise of protected fundamental freedoms connected to the enjoyment of cultural and religious life by these communities. These include wearing hijabs and “abnormal” beards; expanding the scope of “Halal”; closing restaurants during Ramadan; participating in cross-county religious activities “without valid reason”; using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), social media and Internet to teach scriptures and preach; and giving one’s child a Muslim name. They also include various forms of dissent and breaches of other laws and policies, including those relating to family planning, as signs of “extremism”.
“严打”运动导致通过或修改各种法律文书，进一步加强对宗教的监管，从而对宗教进行监管，包括“任何组织或个人有义务自觉抵制宗教极端主义和非法宗教活动”。如上所述，“极端主义”的定义很宽泛，而法律文书包括“极端主义的主要表现形式”清单，在实践中还附有“宗教信仰”的“标志”清单极端主义”，以帮助官员和公众识别社区中的“极端主义”行为。 这些“表达”和“迹象”包括在这种情况下可能引起合理关注的行为，例如“煽动‘圣战’、鼓吹和实施暴力恐怖活动”，但范围更广，包括范围极其广泛的行为，这些行为本身就构成行使受保护的基本自由与这些社区享受文化和宗教生活有关。这些包括戴头巾和“不正常”的胡须；扩大“清真”的范围；斋月期间关闭餐厅； “无正当理由”参加跨县宗教活动的；使用虚拟专用网络 (VPN)、社交媒体和互联网教授经文和讲道； 它们还包括各种形式的异议和违反其他法律和政策，包括与计划生育有关的法律和政策，作为“极端主义”的标志。
84、Such exceptionally broad interpretations of “extremism”, often explicitly targeting standard tenets of Islamic religion and practice, in effect renders virtually all such conduct in potential breach of the regulation of religion and of broader Government policies within the ambit of “counter-extremism” policies, with attendant risks of either criminal sanction and/or re-education. An environment is thus created in which religious or cultural practice or expression is conflated with “extremism” and can lead to serious consequences for persons so identified.
对“极端主义”的这种异常广泛的解释，往往明确针对伊斯兰宗教和实践的标准信条，实际上使几乎所有此类行为都可能违反宗教监管和“反极端主义”范围内的更广泛的政府政策 ”政策，伴随着刑事制裁和/或再教育的风险。 因此创造了一种环境，在这种环境中，宗教或文化实践或表达与“极端主义”混为一谈，并可能对如此认定的人造成严重后果。
85、Alongside the increasing restrictions on expressions of Muslim religious practice are recurring reports of the destruction of Islamic religious sites, such as mosques, shrines and cemeteries, especially during the “Strike Hard” campaign period. According to the Government, 20,000 of the 35,000 mosques in the entire country are located in XUAR.Nevertheless, several researchers, predominantly based on detailed analysis of publicly available satellite imagery, consider that a large number of mosques have been destroyed in XUAR over the last years. This trend has also been reported by investigative journalists who have visited the region and compared satellite images with the current physical conditions of the geographic sites in question.The Government, for its part, has consistently denied allegations of improper removal or destruction of religious sites, suggesting instead that mosques are in disrepair and being reconstructed for safety reasons and that basic burials and funeral customs are protected, while cemetery facilities have been improving. The Government has also stated that “people of different ethnic groups in some places have relocated graveyards of their own free will”.
除了对表达穆斯林宗教活动的限制越来越多之外，还有关于伊斯兰宗教场所遭到破坏的报道，例如清真寺、神社和墓地，尤其是在“严打”运动期间。 据政府称，全国 35,000 座清真寺中有 20,000 座位于新疆。尽管如此，一些主要基于对公开卫星图像的详细分析的研究人员认为，过去几年新疆有大量清真寺被摧毁。 访问该地区的调查记者也报道了这一趋势，并比较了这一趋势。 政府一直否认有关不当拆除或破坏宗教场所的指控，而是暗示清真寺年久失修，出于安全原因正在重建， 基本的墓葬和丧葬习俗得到保护，墓地设施得到改善。 政府还表示，“一些地方各族人民自愿搬迁墓地”。
86、Analysis of satellite imagery in the public domain indicates that many religious sites appear to have been removed or changed in their characteristic identifying features, such as the removal of minarets. An illustrative example is the transformation of the Imam Asim Shrine, located in southern Xinjiang, north of the city of Hotan (see images below). This was formerly a pilgrimage site for Uyghurs and other Muslim communities that included the tomb of the Imam, a mosque, and several related tombs. Satellite imagery sourced from Google Earth, between December 2017 and June 2020 shows the shrine demolished and the grave marker, which used to be surrounded by pilgrims’ flags, erased.
对公共领域的卫星图像的分析表明，许多宗教场所的特征识别特征似乎已被移除或改变，例如宣礼塔被移除。 一个说明性的例子是位于新疆南部和田市北部的阿訇阿西姆神社的改造（见下图）。 这以前是维吾尔人和其他穆斯林社区的朝圣地，其中包括伊玛目墓、一座清真寺和几个相关的墓葬。 来自谷歌地球的卫星图像显示，2017 年 12 月至 2020 年 6 月期间，神社被拆除，曾经被朝圣者旗帜包围的墓碑也被抹去。
87、While OHCHR is not able to reach firm conclusions at this stage regarding the extent of the destruction of religious sites, in the absence of meaningful access to sites and fuller information from the Government, these reports remain deeply concerning.
虽然人权高专办现阶段无法就宗教场所被毁的程度得出确切的结论，但由于政府无法对这些场所进行有意义的访问和更全面的信息，这些报告仍然令人深感关切。
88、Concerns have also been raised by UN human rights mechanisms regarding the respect for linguistic rights of ethnic minorities, which are in principle protected under Chinese law. For example, in 2014, in its periodic review of China, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern that ethnic minorities continue to face severe restrictions in the realization of their right to take part in cultural life, including the right to use and teach minority languages, history and culture, as well as to practise their religion freely.
联合国人权机制也对尊重少数民族语言权利提出了关切，这些权利原则上受到中国法律的保护。例如，2014 年，联合国经济委员会在其对中国的定期审查中，社会和文化权利对少数民族在实现参与文化生活的权利，包括使用和教授少数民族语言、历史和文化以及自由信奉其宗教的权利方面继续面临严重限制表示关切 .
89、Several Special Procedures mandate-holders, as well as the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2017 and 2018 respectively, raised concerns about a 2017 directive from primarily Uyghur-populated Hotan county, which requested the authorities to firmly implement teaching in the national common language (Mandarin Chinese) in the three years of pre-school and the first years of elementary and middle school, with a view to achieving full coverage by 2020. In addition, the directive prohibits the use in the educational system of texts, slogans and pictures in the Uyghur language, as well as the use of the Uyghur language for collective activities, public activities and management work. In its responses, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to bilingual education in XUAR, but did not question the authenticity of the directive nor clarify whether it remained in force. Persons interviewed by OHCHR also recounted that, at least since 2014, there were closures of schools providing instruction in Uyghur and/or Kazakh language, and that teachers were being progressively removed from their bilingual duties.
在学前三年和中小学一年级，坚决实施国家通用语言（普通话）教学，力争到2020年实现全覆盖。在维吾尔语文字、标语和图片的教育体系中，以及维吾尔语在集体活动、公共活动和管理工作中的使用。政府在答复中重申了其对新疆双语教育的承诺，但没有质疑该指令的真实性，也没有澄清它是否仍然有效。 人权高专办采访的人还说，至少自 2014 年以来，已经关闭了提供维吾尔语和/或哈萨克语教学的学校，并且教师正逐渐被解除双语职责。
90、According to the Government, all primary and secondary schools have incorporated into their curriculum spoken and written languages of ethnic minority groups, on top of courses in standard spoken and written Chinese language. Courses in ethnic minority languages are mandatory (locally) from 1st to 8th grades, and optional in senior high schools. Textbooks are available in four ethnic minority languages. An increasing number of students are studying ethnic languages, including Uyghur and Kazakh, at the undergraduate and postgraduate level.
根据政府的说法，所有中小学在普通汉语语言课程的基础上，均已将少数民族语言文字课程纳入其课程。少数民族语言课程从 1 年级到 8 年级是必修课（本地），在高中时是选修课。有四种少数民族语言的教科书。越来越多的学生在本科和研究生阶段学习少数民族语言，包括维吾尔语和哈萨克语。
91、The restrictions described in this section pose significant concerns from an international human rights law perspective. International law specifically protects the right to freedom of religion or belief, a right exercised individually and collectively, in its complementary components of having a religion of one’s choice and in manifesting it. The manifestation of religion includes worship, whether in forms of religious prayer and preaching, display of symbols, or building of places of worship, as well as observance and practice, including customs such as observance of religious holidays marking important points in the religious calendar and dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or use of a particular language, and teaching, encompassing freedoms to choose one’s own religious leaders, establish religious schools and prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.International standards are clear that the right to freedom of religion cannot be derogated from, even in times of emergency. The right to choose one’s religion or belief, as well as the right to profess one’s religion privately, can also not be limited. Only the public manifestation of religion or belief may be subject to certain limitations, where they are prescribed by law and necessary and proportional to achieve a legitimate aim, such as to protect public safety, order, health and morals, or to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
从国际人权法的角度来看，本节中描述的限制引起了重大关注。国际法特别保护宗教或信仰自由的权利，这是一项单独和集体行使的权利，在其互补的组成部分拥有一个人选择的宗教并体现它。宗教的表现形式包括崇拜，无论是以宗教祈祷和布道的形式，展示符号，或建造礼拜场所，以及遵守和实践，包括遵守宗教节日等习俗，标志着宗教日历中的重要时刻和饮食规定、穿着独特的服装或使用特定语言以及教学，包括选择自己的宗教领袖、建立宗教学校以及准备和分发宗教文本或出版物的自由。国际标准明确规定，宗教自由权即使在紧急情况下也不能减损。选择宗教或信仰的权利，以及私下信奉宗教的权利，也不能受到限制。只有宗教或信仰的公开表达才可能受到某些限制，这些限制是法律规定的，是实现合法目标所必需和相称的，例如保护公共安全、秩序、健康和道德，或保护基本权利和他人的自由。
92、The restrictions imposed on the exercise of freedom of religion with respect to Islamic religious practice in XUAR fall short of these standards. In terms of the legality requirement, while some restrictions are legally prescribed, others are a consequence of certain types of conduct being considered a “sign of extremism” in practice, even if the conduct as such may in fact not be unlawful, such as having a long beard or declining to use a television. Further, an aim to combat and extinguish “religious extremism”, given its breadth and vagueness, cannot of itself be a legitimate aim under international human rights law. Finally, generalized restrictions on a wide range of manifestations of accepted religious tenets cannot be characterised as necessary or proportional to such an aim.
新疆对伊斯兰教的宗教活动实行宗教自由的限制没有达到这些标准。 在合法性要求方面，虽然某些限制是法律规定的，但其他限制是某些类型的行为在实践中被视为“极端主义迹象”的结果，即使这种行为实际上可能并不违法，例如 长胡子或拒绝使用电视。 此外，打击和消除“宗教极端主义”的目标，鉴于其广度和模糊性，其本身不能成为国际人权法下的合法目标。 最后，对公认的宗教信条的广泛表现形式的普遍限制不能被认为是必要的或与这一目标成比例。
93、International law prohibits discrimination, including that based on religious or ethnic identity,and protects minorities in the enjoyment of their culture, the professing of their religion and the use of their language.In as much as the Government’s laws and policies, including in the context of the “Strike Hard” campaign, specifically restrict and suppress practices that are part of the identity and cultural life of persons belonging to Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities, they also raise concerns of discrimination against such minorities on prohibited grounds.
国际法禁止歧视，包括基于宗教或族裔身份的歧视，并保护少数群体享受其文化、信奉其宗教和使用其语言。与政府的法律和政策一样，包括在“严打”运动的背景下，特别限制和压制属于维吾尔人和其他主要是穆斯林少数群体的人的身份和文化生活的一部分的做法，它们也引起了人们对基于禁止理由歧视这些少数群体的担忧。
Rights to privacy and freedom of movement
B. 隐私权和行动自由权
94、The enforcement of the Government’s counterterrorism and “extremism” policies are accompanied by allegations of extensive forms of intensive surveillance and control.
政府反恐和“极端主义”政策的执行伴随着广泛形式的密集监视和控制的指控。
95、As highlighted above, public security organs are given sweeping powers to prevent, investigate and respond to terrorist and “extremist” acts, including to employ “technological investigative measures” and to collect and retain data regarding several aspects of life, including personal biometric data. The Criminal Procedure Law allows public security officials to use special investigative techniques, including electronic surveillance,while the Counter-Terrorism Law allows them to impose a range of restrictive measures on suspects.
如上所述，公安机关被赋予广泛的权力来预防、调查和应对恐怖主义和“极端主义”行为，包括采用“技术侦查措施”以及收集和保留有关生活多个方面的数据，包括个人生物特征数据。《刑事诉讼法》允许公安人员使用特殊侦查手段，包括电子监控， 而《反恐怖主义法》允许他们对嫌疑人实施一系列限制措施。
96、These broad legal powers provide legal underpinning for what has been alleged to be a sophisticated, large-scale and systematized surveillance system in practice, implemented across the entire region both online and offline. Available descriptions suggest that this system has been developed in partnership with private security and technology companies which supply the requisite technology, including for in-person and electronic monitoring in the form of biometric data collection, including iris scans and facial imagery. Such monitoring has reportedly been driven by an ever-present network of surveillance cameras, including deploying facial recognition capabilities; a vast network of “convenience police stations” and other checkpoints; and broad access to people’s personal communication devices and financial histories, coupled with analytical use of big data technologies.
这些广泛的法律权力为据称在实践中在整个地区在线和离线实施的复杂、大规模和系统化的监控系统提供了法律基础。现有描述表明，该系统是与提供必要技术的私人安全和技术公司合作开发的，包括以生物特征数据收集形式进行的现场和电子监控，包括虹膜扫描和面部图像。据报道，这种监控是由始终存在的监控摄像头网络驱动的，包括部署面部识别功能；庞大的“便利派出所”网络和其他检查站；广泛访问人们的个人通信设备和财务历史，以及对大数据技术的分析使用。
97、Documents now in the public domain appear to detail (i) a police database containing hundreds of thousands of police files, many of which indicate widespread surveillance of the “ethnic language population”; (ii) documents that appear to be of an official nature in the form of so-called “bulletins” from a police platform that serves to store data on individuals that can be flagged for potential detention, called the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP); and (iii) a police application used to communicate with the IJOP system aggregating diverse data about people it deems potentially threatening based on specific kind of behaviours and indicators.
现在公共领域的文件似乎详述了 (i) 一个警察数据库，其中包含数十万份警察档案，其中许多表明对“民族语言人口”的广泛监视； (ii) 似乎属于 官方性质的所谓“公告”形式的警察平台，该平台用于存储可能被标记为可能被拘留的个人的数据，称为“综合联合行动平台”（IJOP）； 和（iii）警察 用于与 IJOP 系统通信的应用程序，根据特定类型的行为和指标，聚合关于它认为可能受到威胁的人的各种数据。
98、Taken together, these suggest key elements of a consistent pattern of invasive electronic surveillance that can be, and are, directed at the Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim populations, whereby certain behaviours, such as downloading of Islamic religious materials or communicating with people abroad, can be automatically monitored and flagged to law enforcement as possible signs of “extremism” requiring police follow-up, including potential referral to a VETC facility or other detention facilities. Available materials also detail how police utilise community informants to collect information, as well as how Chinese nationals who have acquired foreign citizenship and requested visas to return home can be closely monitored.
综上所述，这些都表明了侵入性电子监视模式的关键要素，这种侵入性电子监视可以而且现在针对维吾尔人和其他以穆斯林为主的人群，其中某些行为，例如下载伊斯兰宗教材料或与国外的人交流, 可以自动监控并向执法部门标记为可能的“极端主义”迹象，需要警方跟进，包括可能转介到 VETC 设施或其他拘留设施。现有材料还详细说明了警方如何利用社区线人收集信息，以及如何密切监控获得外国公民身份并申请回国签证的中国公民。
99、In addition to online surveillance, from at least 2016 onwards, XUAR also saw a significant expansion of physical checkpoints guarded by heavily armed police units on main roads, in villages and neighbourhoods, as well as other forms of monitoring of people’s movement. A proliferation of so-called “convenience police stations” and security checkpoints throughout the region was described to OHCHR. In the words of one interviewee, “a road that would have taken 2.5 hours now took 9 hours”. Interviewees also described that permission from local authorities was apparently needed to leave one’s home and travel even to the next village.There are reports that such restrictions to free movement were applied in a targeted and discriminatory manner, whereby ethnic community members were systematically checked at roadblocks and checkpoints, including at airports, while others could pass through so-called “green channels”. Available information also strongly suggests that Government officials began confiscating passports of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities around 2014, and that this practice increased from the end of 2016 onwards. Some reported that when traveling from abroad to China, the mention in one’s passport of “Xinjiang” as their place of residence (hukou) was enough to be singled out for specific questioning.
除了在线监控之外，至少从 2016 年起，新疆维吾尔自治区还发现，在主要道路、村庄和社区，由全副武装的警察部队守卫的物理检查站以及其他形式的人员流动监控显着扩大。人权高专办向人权高专办描述了在整个地区大量涌现的所谓“便利派出所”和安全检查站。用一位受访者的话来说，“一条原本需要 2.5 小时的道路现在需要 9 小时”。 受访者还描述说，显然需要地方当局的许可才能离开自己的家，甚至前往下一个村庄。有报道称，这种对自由流动的限制是以有针对性和歧视性的方式实施的，在路障和检查站对族裔社区成员进行系统检查，包括在机场，而其他人可以通过所谓的“绿色通道”。现有信息还强烈表明，政府官员在 2014 年左右开始没收维吾尔人和其他以穆斯林为主的少数民族的护照，并且这种做法从 2016 年底开始有所增加. 有人报告说，从国外到中国旅行时，护照上会提到“新疆”他们的居住地（户口）足以被挑出来进行具体询问.
100、Furthermore, in 2014 the Government began the Fanghuiju programme, a three-year campaign in XUAR to “Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People”, by which it sent 200,000 cadres to regularly visit people in their homes and undertake community level development.228 In 2016, the authorities then started the “Becoming Family” campaign, under which cadres and civil workers of all ethnic groups are paired with each other through regular visits. In December 2017, the programme was significantly expanded as authorities sent over 1 million cadres to spend a week living in mainly rural homes. In early 2018, this “home stay” programme was again extended, with cadres spending at least five days every two months in families’ homes. According to the Government, since 2016, under these “ethnic unity” campaigns, some 1.1 million officials have “paired up and made friends” with 1.6 million local people, “treating each other like family members” and “forged deep bonds through close interactions”.
此外，2014年，政府在新疆开展了为期三年的“走访群众、造福群众、凝聚人心”活动，派出20万干部定期走访群众。 228 2016 年，当局启动了“成为一家人”运动，在该运动中，各族干部和文职人员通过定期走访结对结对。 2017 年 12 月，随着当局派出超过 100 万名干部到主要农村家庭生活一周，该计划显着扩大。 2018年初，这一“寄宿家庭”计划再次延长，干部每两个月至少在家里呆五天。政府表示，自 2016 年以来，在这些“民族团结”运动中，约有 110 万官员与 160 万当地人“结对朋友”，“视亲如人”，“通过密切互动结下了深厚的感情” .
101、Such homestay programmes are presented by the Government as promoting social cohesion and community development. They appear to be involuntary in nature and have obvious and significant implications on the privacy of family life. For example, those with first-hand experience with such programmes explained how they were not allowed to pray or speak their own language when the “relatives” were visiting. The “Becoming Family” programme has also had a clear gendered impact. Several women who experienced the programme spoke of sexual harassment and other forms of intrusive discomfort caused by visiting (male) cadres. One interviewee whose husband was detained in a VETC facility while she was subject to the homestay programme recounted her experience as follows: “They ate with us. I prepared food for them. They were there all the time, even when I was doing homework with my kids. The children had to be educated against their father, because they said he had ‘bad ideas’. There was surveillance all day long.”
政府将此类寄宿家庭计划介绍为促进社会凝聚力和社区发展。它们在本质上似乎是非自愿的，并且对家庭生活的隐私具有明显和重要的影响。例如，那些亲身体验过此类项目的人解释说，当“亲戚”来访时，他们不被允许祈祷或说自己的语言。 “成为家庭”项目也产生了明显的性别影响。几位体验过该项目的女性 谈到了来访（男性）干部造成的性骚扰和其他形式的侵扰性不适。一位受访者的丈夫在接受寄宿家庭计划期间被拘留在 VETC 设施中，她讲述了她的经历：“他们和我们一起吃饭。我为他们准备了食物。他们一直都在，甚至在我和孩子们做作业的时候。必须教育孩子们反对他们的父亲，因为他们说他有“坏主意”。整天都有监视。”
102、The laws, policies, programmes and practices described in this section pose several human rights concerns. Everyone has the right to protection against unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence, with privacy encompassing information about one’s physical and social identity and private life, at all times, online and off-line. Any interference with this right must be lawful and not arbitrary, that is necessary to achieve the protection of an essential interest of society, proportionate, and accompanied by sufficient safeguards against abuse. The broad powers given to public officials in XUAR generally, with limited independent oversight and procedural safeguards against abuse, are already of considerable concern, and are exacerbated by the far-reaching and highly invasive methods of surveillance. The heightened focus on Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities through the lens of “extremism” is also likely to be discriminatory in intent and/or effect.
本节所述的法律、政策、方案和做法提出了若干人权问题。每个人都有权免受非法或任意干涉隐私、家庭、住宅或通信， 隐私包括关于个人身体和社会身份以及私人生活的信息，无论何时，无论是在线还是离线。对这一权利的任何干涉都必须是合法的，而不是任意的，这对于实现对社会基本利益的保护是必要的、相称的，并伴随着充分的保障措施以防止滥用。 新疆一般授予公职人员的广泛权力，但有限防止滥用的独立监督和程序保障已经引起了相当大的关注，并且由于影响深远和高度侵入性的监视方法而加剧。从“极端主义”的角度高度关注维吾尔人和其他以穆斯林为主的少数民族，也可能在意图和/或效果上具有歧视性。
103、International human rights law also enshrines the right to freedom of movement, which includes the right to liberty of movement and residence within a country’s borders as well at the right to leave a country, including one’s own.That right is only subject to restrictions that are provided by law and are strictly necessary for national security, public safety, or public order, and are consistent with other human rights. Such restrictions may not have a discriminatory intent or effect. The various policies and practices in XUAR, as described above, raise concerns in this regard.
国际人权法还规定了迁徙自由权，其中包括在一个国家境内迁徙和居住的自由权以及离开一个国家，包括自己的国家的权利。 该权利仅受法律规定的、为国家安全、公共安全或公共秩序所必需的，并符合其他人权的限制。此类限制可能没有歧视性意图或效果。如上所述，新疆的各种政策和做法引起了这方面的担忧。
生殖权
104、Further allegations have been advanced with regard to violations of reproductive rights in XUAR. These allegations should be located in the context of broader human rights concerns with respect to sexual and reproductive rights in China. In its 2014 concluding observations, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, while welcoming the Government’s decision to revise the “one-child policy”, remained concerned that there continued to be restrictions on the opportunity for persons to freely decide on the number of children they have. The Committee noted information provided by the Government that the Population and Family Planning Law prohibits the use of coercive measures to implement the birth quota but remained “seriously concerned about reported instances of the use of coercive measures, including forced abortion and forced sterilization, with a view to limiting births”. The UN Committee on the Elimination Discrimination against Women has also urged China to consider removing sanctions on women who violate the family planning policy.
关于新疆维吾尔自治区侵犯生殖权利的进一步指控已被提出。这些指控应置于中国性权利和生殖权利方面的更广泛人权问题的背景下。联合国经济、社会和文化权利委员会在其 2014 年的结论性意见中，虽然欢迎政府决定修改“独生子女政策”，但仍然关注人们自由决定他们有多少孩子。联合国消除对妇女歧视委员会也敦促中国考虑取消对违反计划生育政策的妇女的制裁。
105、Prior to 2017, ethnic minorities such as the Uyghurs were allowed to have one more child than Han Chinese, meaning that urban Uyghur couples could have two children and rural Uyghur couples could have three children, while urban Han were allowed one child and rural Han were allowed two children respectively. Overall, the Government reports that the population of XUAR grew from 12.98 million in the 2010 census to 14.93 million in the 2020 census, and that the Uyghur population grew from 10 million in the 2010 census to 11.6 million in the 2020 census, an annual average of 1.52 per cent.
2017年之前，维吾尔等少数民族比汉人多生一个孩子，这意味着城市维吾尔族夫妇可以生育两个孩子，农村维吾尔族夫妇可以生育三个孩子，而城市汉族可以生育一个孩子，农村可以生育一个孩子。韩分别被允许生两个孩子。总体而言，政府报告称，新疆维吾尔自治区人口从 2010 年人口普查的 1298 万增长到 2020 年人口普查的 1493 万，维吾尔族人口从 2010 年人口普查的 1000 万增长到 2020 年人口普查的 1160 万，年均值1.52%。
106、In 2017, XUAR amended its regional family planning policy to permit people of all ethnic groups to have two children in urban areas and three in rural, thus equalizing the policy and allowing Han Chinese couples to have equal numbers of children as ethnic minorities.The amendments also enhanced enforcement, including through a threefold increase in the “social maintenance payment” payable by persons who violate the policy. In June 2021, in line with the new national policy, XUAR introduced the three-child policy for all ethnic groups.
2017 年，新疆维吾尔自治区修订了地方计划生育政策，允许各族人民在城市生育两个孩子，在农村生育三个孩子，从而实现政策平等，允许汉族夫妇与少数民族平等生育孩子。 修正案还加强了执法力度，包括将违反政策的人应支付的“社会抚养费”增加三倍。 2021 年 6 月，根据新的国家政策，新疆实行了三孩政策团体。
107、Official population figures indicate a sharp decline in birth rates in XUAR from 2017.242 Data from the 2020 Chinese Statistical Yearbook, covering 2019, shows that in the space of two years the birth rate in Xinjiang dropped approximately 48.7 per cent, from 15.88 per thousand in 2017 to 8.14 per thousand in 2019. The average for all of China is 10.48 per thousand.243
官方人口数据显示，新疆的出生率自 2017 年以来急剧下降。《2020 年中国统计年鉴》涵盖 2019 年的数据显示，在两年的时间里，新疆的出生率从 15.88‰下降了约 48.7%。从 2017 年到 2019 年的 8.14‰。中国的平均水平是 10.48‰.
The blue line represents % of births per 10,000 in XUAR. The red line represents % of births per 10,000 in the whole of China.
蓝线代表新疆每 10,000 人的出生百分比。 红线代表全中国每万人出生人口的百分比。
108、Uyghur-majority areas represented the bulk of this decline, with two of the largest Uyghur prefectures especially affected by it. In Hotan, which is 96 per cent Uyghur, birth rates went from 20.94 per cent in 2016 to 8.58 per cent per thousand births in 2018.Similarly, the birth rate in Kashgar, which is approximately 92.6 per cent Uyghur, dropped from 18.19 per cent in 2016 to 7.94 per cent per thousand births in 2018. Even taking into account the overall decline in birth rates in China, these figures remain unusual and stark. The same applies to the figures regarding sterilisations and IUD placements in XUAR, with official data indicating an unusually sharp rise in both forms of procedures in the region during 2017 and 2018, in comparison with the rest of China. For example, in 2018, sterilisations in XUAR stood at per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas the overall figure for China was a fraction thereof at only 32.1 per 100,000 inhabitants.
维吾尔族占多数的地区是这一下降的主要部分，两个最大的维吾尔州特别受其影响。 在维吾尔族占 96% 的和田，出生率从 2016246 年的 20.94% 下降到 2018年的 8.58%。同样，维吾尔族占 92.6% 的喀什地区的出生率从 18.19% 下降 从 2016年到 2018 年的 7.94%。 即使考虑到中国出生率的总体下降， 这些数字仍然不寻常且明显。 这同样适用于新疆维吾尔自治区的绝育和宫内节育器放置数据，官方数据显示，与中国其他地区相比，2017 年和 2018 年该地区两种形式的手术都异常急剧上升。 例如，在 2018 年， 新疆的绝育率为每 10 万居民 人，而中国的总体数字仅为每 10 万人 32.1 人的一小部分。
109、While the high birth rates among Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities prior to 2017 can partially be attributed to less strict implementation of family planning policies before that time, a number of other factors credibly contribute to this significant and rapid drop in birth rates. The Government states that it conforms with broader global trends, as urbanization and modernization lower birth and death rates. At the same time, various Government documents indicate that frequency in childbirth among the ethnic population in XUAR is associated with “extremism”, eliciting punitive responses under XUAR’s counter- terrorism and counter-“extremism” framework. For example, in its September 2021 White Paper on “Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data”, the Government makes a clear link between frequency in child births and religious “extremism”, noting that “in the past, under the prolonged, pervasive and toxic influence of religious “extremism”, the life of a large number of people in Xinjiang and particularly in the southern part of the region was subject to severe interference, early marriage and childbearing, and frequent pregnancy and childbirth were commonplace among ethnic minorities”. The XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations (XRAR) prohibit “the use of religion to obstruct […] family planning”, and the XUAR Regulation on De-extremification (XRD) of 2017 included “deliberately interfering with or undermining the implementation of family planning policies” as one of the 15 “primary expressions” of religious extremism.
虽然 2017 年之前维吾尔族和其他穆斯林少数民族的高出生率部分归因于在此之前的计划生育政策实施不那么严格，但许多其他因素确实促成了出生率的显着和快速下降。政府表示，它符合更广泛的全球趋势，因为城市化和现代化降低了出生率和死亡率。同时，多份政府文件表明，新疆少数民族人口生育频率与“极端主义”有关，在新疆反恐和反“极端主义”框架下引发了惩罚性反应。例如，在 2021 年 9 月的《新疆人口动态与数据》白皮书中，政府明确将生育频率与宗教“极端主义”联系起来，并指出“过去，在长期、普遍和有毒的影响下受宗教“极端主义”影响，新疆特别是南部地区大量民众生活受到严重干扰，少数民族早婚早育、频孕生育现象司空见惯。新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例（XRAR）禁止“利用宗教阻挠计划生育”，2017年新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例（XRD）包括“故意干预或破坏计划生育政策的实施”作为宗教极端主义的 15 种“主要表现形式”之一。
110、This association between child-bearing, family planning and “extremism” is further reflected in a number of official XUAR county-level regulations, which indicate that those found to be in violation of the family planning policy would be referred to “vocational skills education and training” and that “long-term birth control measures should be adopted”.258 In addition, official documents in the public domain that are likely to be authentic, notably the “Karakax List”, have indicated that family planning violations were among the most common reasons for referral to a VETC facility.
生育、计划生育和“极端主义”之间的这种关联在新疆的一些县级官方规定中得到进一步体现，这些规定表明，那些违反计划生育政策的人将被移交给“职业技能教育和培训”和“应采取长期的节育措施”。此外，可能是真实的公共领域的官方文件，特别是“卡拉卡克斯清单”，表明违反计划生育的行为是最转诊到 VETC 设施的常见原因。
111、Several women interviewed by OHCHR raised allegations of forced birth control, in particular forced IUD placements and possible forced sterilisations with respect to Uyghur and ethnic Kazakh women. Some women spoke of the risk of harsh punishments including “internment” or “imprisonment” for violations of the family planning policy. Among these, OHCHR interviewed some women who said they were forced to have abortions or forced to have IUDs inserted, after having reached the permitted number of children under the family planning policy.These first-hand accounts, although limited in number, are considered credible.
人权高专办采访的几名妇女提出了有关强制节育的指控，特别是对维吾尔族和哈萨克族妇女的强制宫内节育器放置和可能的强制绝育。一些妇女谈到因违反计划生育政策而受到严厉惩罚的风险，包括“拘禁”或“监禁”。其中，人权高专办采访了一些妇女，她们说她们在达到计划生育政策允许的孩子数量后被迫堕胎或被迫植入宫内节育器。这些第一手资料虽然数量有限，但被认为是可信的.
112、The right to the highest attainable standard of health comprises sexual and reproductive freedom, which includes the right of individuals and couples “to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children”. Any restrictions of reproductive freedoms, for example in the context of population control policies imposed by States in the asserted wider interests of common welfare, must be in conformity with international law and standards: they must be proportional to the legitimate aim pursued and must never be discriminatory. International standards further require that family planning policies should not be compulsory or based on coercion.
享有可达到的最高健康标准的权利包括性自由和生殖自由，其中包括个人和夫妻“自由和负责任地决定其子女的数量、间隔和时间”的权利。对生殖自由的任何限制，例如在国家为声称的更广泛的共同福利利益而实施的人口控制政策的背景下，都必须符合国际法和标准：它们必须与所追求的合法目标相称，绝不能歧视性的。国际标准进一步要求计划生育政策不应是强制性的或基于胁迫的。
113、The available information, however, suggests that coercive measures are likely to have accompanied the strict enforcement of family planning policies post-2017, including in the context of the Government’s purported counter-terrorism and counter-“extremism” policies, and to have been a cause for the significant decreases in the birth rates in Xinjiang generally, and especially in predominantly Uyghur-populated areas. The increase in IUD placements and sterilisation procedures during this period also occurs in the context of coercive family planning policies enforced by strict measures, such as fines, referrals and threats of referral to VETC or other detention facilities, in breach of the reproductive rights during the period 2017-2019. Although the policies in XUAR have appeared nominally consistent with the Government’s broader approach to population planning, it appears they are linked to an expansive notion of religious “extremism”, raising further concerns about discriminatory enforcement of these policies against Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities.
然而，现有信息表明，强制性措施可能伴随着 2017 年后计划生育政策的严格执行，包括在政府所谓的反恐和反“极端主义”政策的背景下，并且一直是导致新疆总体出生率显着下降，尤其是在维吾尔族为主的地区。在此期间宫内节育器放置和绝育程序的增加也发生在强制计划生育政策的背景下，这些政策通过严格措施执行，例如罚款、转介和威胁转介到 VETC 或其他拘留设施，这违反了生育权。 2017-2019 年期间。尽管新疆维吾尔自治区的政策在名义上似乎与政府更广泛的人口规划方法一致，263 但它们似乎与广泛的宗教“极端主义”概念有关，这引发了对这些政策对维吾尔族和其他以穆斯林为主的少数民族的歧视性执行的进一步担忧.
114、In summary, there are credible indications of violations of reproductive rights through the coercive enforcement of family planning policies since 2017. The lack of available Government data, including post-2019, makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the full extent of current enforcement of these policies and associated violations of reproductive rights.
总之，有可信的迹象表明，自 2017 年以来通过强制执行计划生育政策侵犯了生殖权利。由于缺乏可用的政府数据，包括 2019 年后的数据，因此很难就目前这些政策的全面执行情况得出结论。 政策和相关的对生殖权利的侵犯。
D、Employment and labour issues
就业和劳工问题
115、On 20 April 2022, the National People’s Congress of China approved ratification of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). Previously China had already ratified other relevant ILO conventions including the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) and the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), which provide for equality of opportunity and treatment without discrimination based on race and religion in employment and education, and for free choice of employment. The Government has undertaken a number of important labour law reforms, which should strengthen safeguards against forced labour. Article 96 of the Labour Law prohibits forced labour, and the Labour Contracts Law and Employment Promotion Law provide additional protections. Forced labour is penalised in Article 244 of the Criminal Law, and victims can also bring claims under the Civil Code. In 2013, China formally abolished its “re-education through labour” system, a form of administrative detention imposed by law enforcement authorities and has since rolled back custodial re-education schemes that existed for sex workers and drug addicts throughout the country. China’s Action Plan against Human trafficking (2021- 2030) also recognises trafficking for forced labour.
2022 年 4 月 20 日，中国全国人民代表大会批准批准 1930 年《强迫劳动公约》（第 29 号）和 1957 年《废除强迫劳动公约》（第 105 号）。此前，中国已经批准了其他相关的国际劳工组织公约，包括 1958 年《（就业和职业）歧视公约》（第 111 号）和 1964 年《就业政策公约》（第 122 号），这些公约规定了机会和待遇平等，不得基于基于就业和教育方面的种族和宗教，以及自由选择就业。政府进行了多项重要的劳动法改革，应加强对强迫劳动的保障。 《劳动法》第 96 条禁止强迫劳动，《劳动合同法》和《就业促进法》提供了额外的保护。 《刑法》第 244 条对强迫劳动进行处罚，受害者也可以根据《民法典》提出索赔。 2013 年，中国正式废除了“劳动教养”制度，这是一种由执法部门实施的行政拘留，此后在全国范围内取消了对性工作者和吸毒者的拘禁再教育计划。中国的《打击人口贩运行动计划（2021-2030 年）》也承认以强迫劳动为目的的人口贩运。
116、Employment schemes have been an important component of China’s poverty alleviation programmes, including in Xinjiang. According to the Government’s September 2020 White Paper “Employment and Labour Rights in Xinjiang”, from 2014 to 2019, the total number of people employed in Xinjiang rose from 11.35 million to 13.3 million, an increase of 17.2 per cent. The White Paper also states that the average annual increase in urban employment was more than 471,200 people (148,000 in southern Xinjiang, accounting for 31.4 per cent); and the average annual relocation of “surplus rural labour” was more than 2.76 million people, of whom nearly 1.68 million, or over 60 per cent, were in southern Xinjiang. The focus of these schemes has been on southern Xinjiang, which has lagged behind traditional indicators of development.
就业计划一直是中国扶贫计划的重要组成部分，包括在新疆。根据政府2020年9月发布的《新疆就业与劳动权益》白皮书，2014年至2019年，新疆就业总人数从1135万人增加到1330万人，增长17.2%。白皮书还指出，城镇就业年均增加47.12万人以上（南疆14.8万人，占比31.4%）； “农村富余劳动力”年均搬迁276万人以上，其中南疆近168万人，占比60%以上。这些计划的重点一直是落后于传统发展指标的南疆。
117、The Government closely links its poverty alleviation schemes to the prevention and countering of religious “extremism”. The White Paper alludes to the perceived nexus between religious “extremism” and poverty in XUAR, noting that in the four areas that constitute southern Xinjiang and that are identified as areas of extreme poverty, “terrorists, separatists and extremists […] incite the public to resist learning the standard spoken and written Chinese language, reject modern science, and refuse to improve their vocational skills, economic conditions, and the ability to better their own lives”, and that, as a result, people have fallen into long-term poverty.
政府将扶贫计划与预防和打击宗教“极端主义”紧密联系起来。白皮书提到了新疆的宗教“极端主义”与贫困之间的关系，指出在构成南疆的四个被确定为极端贫困地区的地区，“恐怖分子、分裂分子和极端分子 [……] 煽动公众拒绝学习国家通用语言文字，拒绝现代科学，拒绝提高自己的职业技能、经济条件和改善自己生活的能力”，从而导致人们长期陷入长期贫困。
118、It is against this backdrop that reports have emerged, since at least 2018, of practices of forced or compulsory labour with respect to Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities inside and outside XUAR. These allegations relate to two main contexts: (i) placements in VETC facilities and upon “graduation”; (ii) labour placements in XUAR and in other parts of China, known as “surplus labour” and “labour transfer” schemes.
正是在这种背景下，至少自 2018 年以来，有关维吾尔族和其他以穆斯林为主的少数民族在新疆维吾尔自治区内外的强迫或强制劳动的报道不断出现。这些指控涉及两个主要背景：（i）在 VETC 设施中的安置和“毕业”； (ii) 在新疆和中国其他地区的劳动力安置，称为“剩余劳动力”和“劳动力转移”计划。
国际标准强调技能发展、创造就业和扶贫计划之间的紧密联系，鼓励将其用于促进少数民族等弱势群体的进步，但须遵守自愿和非歧视性应用的关键条件。ICESCR 第 6 条规定了工作权，其中包括每个人自由决定接受或选择工作的权利以及国家有义务废除、禁止和反对一切形式的强迫劳动。 第 8 条《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》还禁止强迫劳动，在目前的具体目的之外，由主管法院进行此类处罚，或因合法命令而被拘留（或在有条件释放期间）的人通常需要的工作或服务。国际劳工组织标准将强迫劳动更具体地定义为“以任何惩罚相威胁，强迫任何人从事的所有工作或服务”，并且该人并非自愿提供。
“惩罚威胁”可以指刑事制裁以及各种形式的胁迫，例如扣留身份和旅行证件、威胁、暴力、施加经济处罚、监禁、延迟或停止支付工资，或丧失权利或其他特权.需要根据这些标准评估各种劳工计划。关于在 VETC 设施中安置强迫劳动的指控，首先应该指出的是，政府的白皮书和其他公开声明显示了 VETC 设施之间的明确联系和就业计划。例如，2019年《新疆职业教育与培训》白皮书指出，“许多在教育培训中心完成学业的学员已进入工厂或企业就业”。官方声明提到了 VETC 和就业之间的“无缝连接”。新疆的公司似乎也受到激励雇用少数民族，包括前职业教育“实习生”。例如，喀什市新闻办公室2018年的一份官方“通知”称，计划将10万人从职业培训转移到就业，同时对愿意雇用“学生”的企业提供大量补贴。
121、The Government states that such employment is based on voluntary labour contracts in accordance with the law. However, the close link between the labour schemes and the counter-“extremism” framework, including the VETC system, raises concerns in terms of the extent to which such programmes can be considered fully voluntary in such contexts. As explained above, the VETC system amounts to large-scale arbitrary deprivation of liberty through involuntary placements in residential facilities and compulsory “training”,. Individuals in the system are, as a result, under a constant “menace of penalty”. For example, detainees in the VETC facilities told OHCHR they had to work within the VETC facilities as part of the “graduation process”, with no possibility of refusal for fear of being kept longer at the facilities.Moreover, provisions in the XUAR Regulation on De-extremification, and other laws, regulations and policies, impose deradicalization duties on enterprises and trade unions, based on the law’s own expansive criteria of religious “extremism”.
政府表示，这种雇佣是基于依法自愿的劳动合同。然而，劳工计划与反“极??